我仍然认为3444的得失是关键，不过DOW的喇叭口形态令我担心，当然喇叭口形态说明仍能上涨甚至创新高，然而一旦不能有效化解喇叭口形态，即突破上轨线并能站稳，其杀伤力也非常大
基本上高位喇叭口形态以下跌为多，所以应密切注意，防止DOW对STI的拖累

次级贷款对美国贷款市场的冲击非常大，前两天跟MAS 里面做信贷的朋友谈，他说现在目前信贷市场几乎停止运行了。信贷市场绝对是受到很大伤害的。

证券市场受到的波及，主要来自于以hedge fund 为主的投资机构的挤兑，除非有很好的经济数据或者公司财报支持，挤兑现象还会波及股市。如果继续有信贷/投资公司因为次级贷款问题宣告危机，那就是雪上加霜了。

挤兑风波目前没有波及到中国股市，因为人民币的监管制度，使得资金流动不方便，所以不能在最快的时间里抛售中国股票，来填补美国或者国际市场的空缺。但是，假以时日，挤兑的风险还是在的。所以上面那个兄弟说得轰炸A股，不是没有可能的事情。

望各位小心投资。

我只是从波浪理论看STI，如果升破3444，那调整可能以ABC结构完成，那么以后应该在回调确认时买入，止损位为低点被打破。
由于道指高升，STI升破3444可能性很大，但我买入还是在回调过程中，不会在上涨时！而且道指的喇叭口形态还是让人不放心。
且战且走吧！设好止损止盈位，滑头一点好

3缺口未补，宁愿采取保守策略，不清仓的原因在于牛市中绝不空仓，免得被诱多

Hk mkt in red now.

AMSTERDAM (Thomson Financial) - NIBC Bank, a Dutch unlisted merchant bank currently planning an IPO, said that recent turmoil in US sub-prime credit markets has led to a one-off loss of 137 mln eur on its US ABS Investment book in the first half of the year.

The bank said it expects further losses on its ABS Investment book.

NIBC Bank this morning released unscheduled preliminary first-half results.

Net profit attributable to parent shareholders dropped to 3 mln eur, from 190 mln eur in the same period last year. NIBC noted that last year's first-half earnings were notably higher due to the sale of the Harcourt unit.

Profit after tax from continuing operations in the first half was 141 mln eur, from 150 mln eur a year back.

NIBC reiterated that it intends to take 'next steps toward the preparation of its IPO in September'.

如果股票市场到一定时候，他的回报/风险已经诱人到超过TB，你说会发生什么事情呢？

目前各种negatvie news会一步一步出来的，从来不是新闻drive market down，早就谱好曲子了，现在就是按谱子演奏啊，（注：谱曲的不是什么神或者庄！）
再大的事儿，主要就是


junk bond level credit market 的崩溃引发的连锁反应。



大势方向？中期调整哦。这个还是挺明朗的啊。。。由于资金流动，投资者一时的风险喜好而产生的调整，我始终觉得以现在的经济，不至于使熊市第一波，如果否定了这个，剩下的，不就是牛市中期调整吗呵呵，这才大约2周不到，再给他一个月（减去4天）啦。

自美国证券交易委员会(SEC)的信息显示，世界第二大富豪比尔·盖茨在过去两周连续大笔抛售他所在的微软公司的股票，累计减持量达到2000万股，套现近6亿美元。

近年来，盖茨等微软高管已多次抛售所持有的股份。5月份，盖茨也曾抛售了2000万股股票。


不过，由于这段时期正值美股因次级抵押贷款风波而大幅震荡，盖茨在此时连续套现也引发了诸多猜测。

连续10个交易日抛售

在截至8月3日的10个交易日，盖茨每天都有大笔卖单成交，数量从100万股到300万股不等，累计抛出的股票数量为2000万股，成交价在28.90美元到31.45美元之间。

下午选些股少量补补，只买低位的

Hayman Capital 2626 Cole Avenue, Suite 200
Dallas, TX 75204
July 30th, 2007
Dear Investors,
Over the past few months, we have seen the exacerbation of the Subprime problem accelerate at a precipitous pace. Wait a minute…I thought the Subprime problem was neatly contained in a nice little box of risk that the Fed had put it in? After many meetings and conversations with the various leaders of brokerage firms and asset managers, I don’t think the Subprime problem is as contained as many would like for you to believe. To understand the massive ripple effects of the Subprime problem, you have to look deeply into who owns the eventual risk and furthermore, how it will affect their behavior going forward.
The Greatest “Bait and Switch” of ALL TIME
I recently spent some time with a senior executive in the structured product marketing group (Collateralized Debt Obligations, Collateralized Loan Obligations, Etc.) of one of the largest brokerage firms in the world. I was in Roses, Spain attending a wedding for a good friend of mine who thought it would be an appropriate time to put the two of us together (given our shared interests in the structured credit markets). This individual proceeded to tell me how and why the Subprime Mezzanine CDO business existed. Subprime Mezzanine CDOs are 10-20X levered vehicles that contain only the BBB and BBB- tranches of Subprime debt. He told me that the “real money” (US insurance companies, pension funds, etc) accounts had stopped purchasing mezzanine tranches of US Subprime debt in late 2003 and that they needed a mechanism that could enable them to “mark up” these loans, package them opaquely, and EXPORT THE NEWLY PACKAGED RISK TO UNWITTING BUYERS IN ASIA AND CENTRAL EUROPE!!!! He told me with a straight face that these CDOs were the only way to get rid of the riskiest tranches of Subprime debt. Interestingly enough, these buyers (mainland Chinese Banks, the Chinese Government, Taiwanese banks, Korean banks, German banks, French banks, UK banks) possess the “excess” pools of liquidity around
the globe. These pools are basically derived from two sources: 1) massive trade surpluses with the US in USD, 2) petrodollar recyclers. These two pools of excess capital are US dollar denominated and have had a virtually insatiable demand for US dollar denominated debt…until now. They have had orders on the various desks of Wall St. to buy any US debt rated “AAA” by the rating agencies in the US. How do BBB and BBB-tranches become AAA? Through the alchemy of Mezzanine-CDOs. With the help of the ratings agencies the Mezzanine CDO managers collect a series of BBB and BBB- tranches and repackage them with a cascading cash waterfall so that the top tiers are paid out first on all the tranches – thus allowing them to be rated AAA. Well, when you lever ONLY mezzanine tranches of Subprime RMBS 10-20X, POOF…you magically have 80% of the structure rated “AAA” by the ratings agencies, despite the underlying collateral being a collection of BBB and BBB- rated assets... This will go down as one of the biggest financial illusions the world has EVER seen. These institutions have these investments marked at PAR or 100 cents on the dollar for the most part. Now that the underlying collateral has begun to be downgraded, it is only a matter of time (weeks, days, or maybe just hours) before the ratings agencies (or what is left of them) downgrade the actual tranches of these various CDO structures. When they are downgraded, these foreign buyers will most likely have to sell them due to the fact that they are only permitted to own “super-senior” risk in the US. I predict that these tranches of mezzanine CDOs will fetch bids of around 10 cents on the dollar. The ensuing HORROR SHOW will be worth the price of admission and some popcorn. Consequently, when I hear people like Kudlow on CNBC tell their viewers that the Subprime problem is “contained”, I can hardly bear to watch.
The Moral Hazard of HOT Potatoes
The key reason the Subprime problem exists as it does today has to do with the wanton disassociation of risk inherent in the machine that churns out Subprime loans. Unlike the S&L crisis of the 1980s, the mortgage lenders of today aren’t taking their own balance sheet risk when underwriting loans. These brokers get paid for quantity REGARDLESS of quality. The balance sheet risk is transferred through three entities in less than 90 days from origination. The originator will originate ANYTHING he can sell to a whole loan buyer to pass the hot potato on. Whole loan buyers are simply the aggregators of loans at the Wall St. firms that aggregate, package, tranche, and sell as quickly as they possibly can to the clueless buyer. This transference of risk is the crux of the Subprime situation. Just think about it…if you were a 20-something making mortgage loans in California using someone else’s balance sheet and being paid per loan (with no lookback to performance of the loan), how many dubious loans would you underwrite?
Buyers are now BEWARE
During and after the rout these investors are about to shoulder, how excited do you think they are going to be to purchase the next “AAA” rated piece of structured finance paper?!!?!?!? These same investors and global pools of liquidity have been funding the Leveraged Buyout (LBO) boom by purchasing the debt that funds the Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) which in turn, buy 60%+ of the LBO debt used to finance these transactions. I also recently spent some time with one of the largest CLO issuers in the world. They had just returned from Japan where they were marketing a new CLO in order to be one of the buyers for new LBO debt. Needless to say, their marketing efforts fell on deaf ears. They were told by the Japanese investors that they have lost confidence in the ratings agencies (you think?) and that in an election year there is too much uncertainty. They basically said, “No more.” If there is not a CLO bid from Asian and Central European banks, where do you think the $290 billion in announced LBOs will go to sell their debt? I actually have no idea how to answer that question myself. We have seen the bank-loan index drop from 100.5 to 90.5 in 5 short weeks, and a widening in investment grade as well as non investment grade credit. In the immediate absence of liquidity, there will be many casualties of levered funds and firms. There will be a “re-pricing” of risk on a global scale that will mean more credit funds being carried out the door feet first.
Latest Casualties
Just today, the latest firm to suffer the wrath of too much leverage and mis-priced risk was Sowood Capital. What is truly remarkable about this particular situation is the fact that Jeff Larson, the former manager of the $30 billion Harvard Endowment, is the principal Manager at this firm. Sowood was renowned as being a “best-in-class” fund. If the former manager of the Harvard endowment managed to lose 57% of his fund (more than $1.7 billion in losses) in just 30 days, how are the “other” credit funds out there doing? How are they calculating Value-at-Risk? This afternoon, brokerage firms were sending collateral calls to other funds positioned similarly to Sowood. They joined the ranks of the two Bear Stearns funds managed by Cioffi, Australia’s Basis Capital, Absolute Capital, and Macquarie Fortress Funds as well investments by Korea’s Woori Bank, and London’s Caliber Fund by liquidating and eventually returning what is left to investors. Not to mention the downfall of the poster child of the levered “positive carry” industry, United Capital Market’s Horizon Fund – managed by John Devaney, owner of the aptly titled 142ft yacht, the Postive Carry (which is incidentally now for sale, all enquiries can be directed to http://www.iyc.com/featured_yachts.cfm?mn=1).
I have recently discovered the insightful writings of someone with whom I have not had the pleasure to speak or meet in person. Howard Marks is the Chairman of Oaktree Capital Management and he recently sent a letter to his clients entitled, “It’s All Good”. Mr. Marks had a most astute observation with regard to the recent investing environment:
“…investors’ recurring acceptance that it’s different this time – or that cycles are no more – is exemplary of a willing suspension of disbelief that springs from glee
over how well things are going (on the part of people who’re in the market) or rationalization of the reasons to throw off caution and get on board (from those who have been watching from the sidelines as prices moved higher and others made money). In this way, the bullish swing of the investment cycle tends to cause skepticism and risk tolerance to evaporate. Faith, credence and open-mindedness all tend to move up – at just the time skepticism, discrimination and circumspection become the qualities that are most needed.”
Credit Markets and Where we are today in Subprime
Last week, I spent some time in the “Inland Empire” of California on a diligence trip to survey the actual damage. As many of you already know, 55% of all Subprime loans were made in California and Florida. The inland empire of California can be described as the central valley that extends from the southern part of the state all the way to the northern part of the state at least 1-hour inland from the coast. Let me start by saying it is MUCH WORSE than even I thought it could be. I met with various mortgage lenders, originators, economists, and capital markets professionals. The overriding theme that I got from them was that “Everyone committed fraud and everyone is responsible for the problem”. They told me that they believe that 90% of all Subprime loans that were made contained some kind of fraud. Either borrowers lied about their incomes or mortgage brokers fudged numbers on the applications to make them pass muster with the needed ratios in order to get loans approved. They also said that of the borrower frauds, 50% of applicants overstated their income by MORE THAN 50%!!! As Kindleberger put so well in his book, Manias, Panics, and Crashes:
The implosion of an asset price bubble always leads to the discovery of frauds and swindles. The supply of corruption increases in a pro-cyclical way much like the supply of credit. Soon after a recession appears likely the loans to firms that were fueling their growth with credit declines as the lenders become more cautious about the indebtedness of individual borrowers and their total credit exposure. In the absence of more credit, the fraud sprouts from the woodwork like mushrooms in a soggy forest.
In California today, home prices are down between 25%-40% in the central valley. From San Bernadino to Stockton, home prices are in free-fall and their physical condition is actually worse than their price decline. The borrowers are locked out of the financing market and there is no logical buyer for these homes outside of the original borrower. The foreclosure wave will hit these neighborhoods like the Asian Tsunami. If you plug in 15% depreciation in housing prices and 50% loss severities into our Subprime model, the capital structure is wiped out all the way to the “AA” tranches.
In the Subprime Credit Strategies Funds, we continue to hold our initial positions and have not taken any profits yet. In Hayman, we are short credit in the US (both Subprime RMBS and corporate credit) and long non-US equities and debt. We are short US consumer based equities, preferreds, and debt. I think the world is going to begin to
decouple from the US and realize that currency appreciation coupled with the globe’s best growth is an attractive alternative to fraudulent ratings, US dollar depreciation, and financial inventions used to export risk.
Sincerely,
J. Kyle Bass
Managing Partner

this sounds like marketing letter. so take with a pinch of salt

due.

Kindly view it "For your information" only :)

老美可以零首付买房子，前几年房子火，引来太多投机客了。杨白劳赖帐后，黄世人只好向黄世人祖宗赖帐了。

道听途说的消息

伯客南大叔那天讲话的意思其实很清楚，就是大家继续前进。

13200附近近期底部不能有效跌破，否则起码有1000点跌幅

2007-08-09 14:16:03
轉寄給朋友
列印




　　【MarketWatch紐約8月9日訊】美股週四暴跌，道指下跌了387點。有關對沖基金被清算的報告加劇了投資者對信貸市場的擔憂，三家央行開始進行干預，以試圖穩定市場。

　　AG Edwards首席分析師阿爾-高曼(Al Goldman)表示，“投資者十分緊張，問題是他們是否會將目光離開次級抵押貸款市場而將目光放得更遠。投資者目前進退維谷。”

　　截至收盤，道瓊斯工業平均指數下跌了387.18點，至13270.68點，跌幅為2.83%。道指30種成份股中共有29只股票下滑。花旗集團下跌了5.2%，領跌金融板塊，JP摩根也下跌了5.0%。

　　道指成份股American International Group Inc. (AIG)下跌了3.3%，該公司表示第二財季淨利潤好於預期，但美國房產市場的持續疲軟令其旗下一部門的業績受到了衝擊。這一全球最大的保險公司表示，房貸違約數量在提高，這意味著抵押貸款市場的破壞性在增強。

　　沃爾瑪 (WMT)表示，七月份開店一年以上店面銷售額增長了1.9%，分析師此前預期沃爾瑪當前同店銷售額增幅為1.5%。該股下跌了4.1%。

　　納斯達克綜合指數下跌了56.49點，至2556.49點，跌幅為2.16%；標準普爾500指數下跌了44.40點，至1453.09點，跌幅為2.96%。

　　在近幾個交易日，尾盤交易波動異常劇烈，一些分析師認為是由於一些交易程序被啟動。

　　紐約證交所成交量為39.72億股，納斯達克市場成交量為25.34億股。紐約證交所上漲股以7比25落後於下跌股，納斯達克市場上漲股以10比20落後於下跌股。

　　信貸危機涉及法國銀行

　　法國銀行集團BNP Paribas週四表示已暫時凍結了旗下三家涉足美國信貸業務的基金，因為由於“流動性完全蒸發”，當前已無法準確評估這些基金的價值。

　　在這一消息傳出後，歐洲央行隨即表示已向49家投標者以快速招標方式向市場輸血948.41億歐元，來改善資金市場的流動性。

　　美聯儲在每週的公開市場操作中也通過為期14天的回購向臨時資金儲備中再次注入120億美元，較前一周注入的金額提高了一倍。Action Economics分析師表示，“這一金額仍符合隔夜資金注入的正常範圍，只是略低於我們的預期。”

　　加拿大銀行隨即跟進，向資本市場注入14.55億加元來改善流動性。

　　兩天前，聯邦公開市場委員會決定維持利率不變並重申控制通貨膨脹仍是其頭等大事，但也承認金融市場近期的風波所帶來的風險。

　　Miller Tabak & Co. LLC分析師Tony Crescenzi在一份報告中表示，“最具諷刺意味的是美聯儲剛剛在週二結束會議。事態發展到如此地步，那怕美聯儲有一點點的預知，他們也會在聲明中採取中立態度，而不是稍稍傾向於控制通貨膨脹。”

　　他表示，“今天的事件說明美聯儲在週二犯下嚴重的政策錯誤。美聯儲與歐洲央行對於這些問題實質的瞭解還不如金融市場的投資者。”

　　DailyFX.com首席分析師Kathy Lien表示，“次級債已成為全球性問題，受到傷害的已不限於小型銀行與抵押貸款公司，全球一流大銀行也未能倖免。”

　　使用電腦模型來追蹤套利機會的對沖基金Black Mesa Capital在週三在一份報告中報告投資者，至少有一家非常大型的衝擊基金或投資銀行正在進行大規模平倉，平倉金額十分“驚人”。

　　這家總部位於新墨西哥州聖達菲的公司在報告中表示，這種減倉行為干擾了市場並給那些所謂“中性的”對沖基金造成了損失。Black Mesa表示，“很明顯，市場上有些事情不對頭，而我們的策略團隊從未經歷過這種形勢。”

　　據“華爾街日報”報道，高盛 (GS)旗下一隻基金在近期減少了部分倉位。

　　勞工部報告上周首次申請失業救濟人數連續第二周增加，創自六月底以來新高。

　　美股週三寬幅振蕩，道指一度從盤中高點迅速回落190點，但在收盤前又大幅反彈。投資者對於美聯儲週二發表的有關經濟成長的評論以及思科利好的財報仍然持樂觀態度。標準普爾500指數週三上漲了20.78點，道指上漲了153.6點。

　　日元上漲

　　在紐約外匯市場，日元匯率全線上揚，美元對日元匯率從週三的119.68美元下跌至118.56日元。歐元對日元匯率從164.81日元下跌至162.39日元。

　　油價走軟，紐約商業交易所九月份交割的輕質原油期貨下跌了56美分，至每桶71.59美元。

　　隨投資者拋售股票買進安全性高的國債，國債市場攀升，收益率下滑。主要交易品種十年期國債價格上漲了21/32點，至99 23/32點，收益率下降至4.787%。

　　黃金期貨大幅下滑。紐約商業交易所十二月份交割的黃金合約下跌了13.50美元，報收每盎司672.80美元，跌幅為2%。